The politics of what works in service delivery: an evidence-based review by Batley, Richard & Mcloughlin, Claire
 
 
University of Birmingham
The politics of what works in service delivery: an
evidence-based review
Batley, Richard; Mcloughlin, Claire
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Batley, R & Mcloughlin, C 2012 'The politics of what works in service delivery: an evidence-based review' ESID
Working Papers, no. 6, Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, Manchester.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
 
 
The politics of what works in service delivery: an
evidence-based review
Batley, Richard; Mcloughlin, Claire
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Batley, R & Mcloughlin, C 2012 'The politics of what works in service delivery: an evidence-based review' ESID
Working Papers, no. 6, Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, Manchester.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 21. Feb. 2018
 email: esid@manchester.ac.uk 
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) 
School of Environment and Development, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK 
www.effective-states.org 
 
 
 
 
ESID Working Paper 06 
 
 
The politics of what works in service delivery:  
An evidence-based review 
 
Claire Mcloughlin1 and Richard Batley1 
 
February 2012 
 
 
 
ISBN: 978-1-908749-01-7 
 
 
1 International Development Department, University of Birmingham 
(email correspondence: c.mcloughlin@bham.ac.uk)
 This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Aid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained in it are not necessarily those 
of or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance placed on them.  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the evidence on the forms of politics likely to promote inclusive social 
provisioning and enable, as opposed to constrain, improvements in service outcomes. It 
focuses on eight relatively successful cases of delivery in a range of country contexts and 
sectors (roads, agriculture, health, education) where independent evaluations demonstrate 
improved outcomes. The paper traces the main characteristics of the political environment 
for these cases, from the national political context, to the politics of sector policymaking, to 
the micro politics of implementation. The findings indicate that it is possible to identify 
connections between good performance and better outcomes at the point of delivery and the 
main forms of politics operating at local, sector and national levels. 
A number of common factors underpinning successful delivery emerge strongly but need to 
be tested through further research. In particular, the paper highlights the relationship 
between inclusive delivery and:  
 periods of crisis and transition;  
 the nature of the political settlement; 
 the types of calculations of political returns being made by political actors at all levels, 
and; 
 the extent to which the state derives or seeks to enhance its legitimacy through the 
provision of a particular service.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Important conceptual advances in understanding the politics of basic service delivery have 
centered on the role of actors, incentives and institutions in enabling or constraining reform. 
However, empirical research exploring how different forms of politics impact on service 
outcomes remains limited and fragmented, leaving little scope for systematic analysis or 
policy uptake. Comparative studies of the political factors that account for variation in service 
outcomes, either across sectors within a country or across regions within a sector, are 
relatively rare. Sector-level political economy analysis has tended to provide highly localised 
insights into specific blockages to reform.  
This paper examines the evidence on the forms of politics likely to generate positive 
incentives for inclusive social provisioning and enable, as opposed to constrain, 
improvements in service outcomes. It focuses on the forms of politics that have underpinned 
eight relatively successful cases of delivery in a range of country contexts and sectors 
(roads, agriculture, health, education) where independent evaluations demonstrate evidence 
of improved outcomes. The paper traces the main characteristics of the political environment 
in which these cases evolved, from the national political context, to the politics of sector 
policymaking, to the micro politics of implementation. Piecing together these layers is 
constrained by the fragmented nature of the literature. However, the findings indicate that it 
is possible to identify connections between good performance and better outcomes at the 
point of delivery and the main forms of politics operating at local, sector and national levels. 
A number of common factors underpinning successful cases of delivery emerge strongly but 
need to be tested through further research. In particular, the studies of what works support 
the prominence given to the role of the nature of the political regime, the political 
conjuncture, and the origins of elite incentives as key determinants of inclusive social 
provisioning. They illustrate the state may have strong incentives for inclusive provision 
where a particular service or good has historically been a key source of state legitimacy and 
an expression of the social contract. Calculations of political returns on the part of political 
actors, linked in some cases to the pursuit of political entrepreneurship, have also been 
critical in some cases where remarkable improvements in service provision have been 
achieved. The characteristics of a particular service – or the extent to which it is targetable, 
‘visible’, measurable and easily credited - affect its political salience and in turn the likelihood 
of state responsiveness. 
Resources alone do not determine outcomes on the ground: politics intervene (in either an 
enabling or constraining role) between policy intention and implementation. Modes of 
provision should be analysed as ‘spheres of politics’ that shape the opportunities for 
collective action and types of accountability relationships that emerge at the point of delivery. 
Some of the cases indicate that strong, top-down accountability reinforced by a legitimate 
state with some degree of moral authority can work, particularly if top-down control can 
‘insulate’ delivery systems from the normal functioning of prevailing political institutions. At 
the local level, there are particular questions raised by the cases about the positive effects of 
social accountability systems that are genuinely locally-grounded and draw on moral and 
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cultural norms. At the point of implementation, reciprocal terms of collaboration between 
state and non-state actors may be instrumental.  
The paper concludes that future research might usefully examine service provision as a two-
way process in which services are formed by, and formative of, state-society relations and 
processes of state building. As such, research should begin with the point of contact with 
citizens/users, and seek to add meaning to the concept of the social contract. It should adopt 
a ‘bottom-up’ approach that focuses on the relatively neglected arena of the politics of 
implementation, where policies are (re-)interpreted and blockages to performance often 
occur. A broad conceptual framework for researching the politics of service provision is 
proposed that emphasises the fundamental question of control - that is, how and by whom is 
control exercised over what services are delivered to whom. Further research into the 
politics of what works would enhance policymakers’ understanding of the reasons for 
variation in service outcomes, informing efforts to address widespread under-provision. 
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1. The debate about politics and service delivery  
 
The pervasive failure of governments in developing countries to adequately provide services that 
meet the basic needs of poor people has been largely, though not exclusively, attributed to problems 
of weak capacity. At the same time, there is now consensus that politics matters, that institutions 
‘rule’, and that donors need to understand, even if they are not fully able to engage with, the political 
aspects of reform (Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011; Unsworth, 2010). It is not that politics has been 
entirely absent from the diagnoses of the under-provision of services, just that it has rarely been 
systematically examined as the principal cause.  
 
It is well understood, at the conceptual level at least, that politics underlies or exacerbates capacity 
constraints
1
. The idea of service provision as an inherently political undertaking, intimately bound up 
with the nature of the state and the formation of the social contract, has both a long tradition in 
political science and has enjoyed a recent revival in donor thinking around state-building (OECD, 
2008). The central tenets of the seminal World Development Report (2004) – that accountability 
relationships are key to effective and inclusive services, and under-provision is a measure of the 
failure of representative democracy and the ‘long-route’ of accountability – remain deeply influential. 
Recent efforts to address so-called ‘political market imperfections’ by enhancing user participation in 
assessments of service quality, or publicising information about expenditure, are all implicitly based 
on improving political incentives
2
, and a response to the perceived deficiencies in political 
accountability (Keefer, 2007; Gauthier and Reinikka, 2007). There is now consensus that political 
institutions determine incentives for the allocation of public goods (Harding and Wantchekon, 2010). 
Empirical studies continue to support this view by demonstrating that political actors, under certain 
circumstances, may prefer to target narrow groups rather than pursue inclusive, broad-based 
provision, based on calculations of political returns (or attracting votes) (Collier, 2007).
3
  
 
At the point of implementation, where policies often encounter vested interests and falter, whether 
and how services are delivered may depend in particular on the structure of incentives facing 
providers and recipients (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; Collier, 2007). As Booth (2011a) observes, 
there is now widespread acknowledgement that what appear on the surface as capacity limitations 
have their origins in incentive structures.
4
 Specifically, service delivery is likely to face problems to do 
with the motivations of frontline staff, the heterogeneity of customer needs and demands, and the 
difficulty of measuring and monitoring performance (Collier, 2007). The principal-agent problem has 
been a central framework for understanding why behaviour in service delivery organisations so often 
‘fails to correspond to the expected pattern’ (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006, cited in Booth, 
2011b:14)
5
. As Pritchett and Woolcock (2004:196) explain, because the provision of services is key, 
discretionary, and transaction intensive, with multiple principals and agents, delivering services 
through the public sector may well be ‘the mother of all institutional and organizational design 
                                                             
1
 For basic definitions of the conceptual terms used in relation to service provision in this paper, see Annex 1.  
2
 Incentives are ‘the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be related to their actions and those of 
others’ and can be material or non-material (Ostrom et al, 2002: 36, cited in Harris, Jones and Kooy, 2011:26). 
3
 For example, Andre and Mesple-Somps (2009) found that during the period of rule under the NDC in Ghana, districts that 
voted for the opposition party received more public goods than others in an attempt by the ruling party to consolidate their 
position by appeasing potential opposing forces. Similarly, a recent study of the politics of road allocation in Kenya by Burgess 
et al (2010) concluded that because of the context of high ethnic fractionalization, successive presidents have pursued ethnic 
alliances by investing in roads in districts where their own ethnicity is dominant, and in districts dominated by the second most 
powerful ethnic group. 
4
 The role of incentives as bottlenecks in the under-provision of vital public goods is a central concern of the Africa Power and 
Politics Programme. See: http://www.institutions-africa.org/  
5
 The ‘principal-agent’ model draws attention to the difficulties that citizens (as ‘principals’) face in ensuring the actions of self -
interested politicians (the ‘agents’) are aligned with their purpose, and the problem that governments (as ‘principals’) face in 
constraining the behaviour of their bureaucracies (as ‘agents’) (Batley, 2004). 
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problems’. In developing countries, as Batley (2004) has argued, the bureaucratic arena is itself highly 
politicised, inter-connected with societal interests, and often forms the basis of patronage.
6
    
 
In spite of a growing understanding about the various ways that service provision can be exposed to 
political influence, technical studies and evaluation reports examining the determinants of service 
outcomes often provide explanations that are entirely disconnected from political economy questions 
about political incentives, actors and institutions. Where politics is considered in the diagnosis of 
performance, it is typically seen as a constraining rather than enabling factor, and is often reduced to 
superficial, unconvincing categories like ‘lack of political will’, or ‘patrimonial politics’, or ‘weak 
incentives’ (Hickey, 2007). As Crook (2010) concluded in his review of the literature examining civil 
service reforms in Africa, ‘lack of political commitment’ is the favourite catch-all term for failure, but 
politics remains the ‘poor cousin’ among a group of better-understood, capacity-based explanations. 
In sum, the widespread consensus that politics matters has not been matched by rigorous research 
into how different forms of politics are likely to determine whether and how services are delivered.  
 
This paper examines the available evidence on the political determinants of service provision, 
departing from the main thrust of recent literature in two ways: first, in its focus on how politics 
accounts for variation in outcomes; and second, in considering how politics has enabled as opposed 
to constrained reform and underpinned cases of relatively successful delivery. The paper aims to 
situate a strand of research on the ‘politics of what works’ - by the Effective States and Inclusive 
Development (ESID) research programme - in an evidence-based review of what is already known 
about the forms of politics that may generate incentives for inclusive provision and ultimately better 
outcomes for poor people
7
.  
 
The paper examines eight cases of relatively successful delivery and traces the main characteristics 
of the political environment in which these cases evolved, from the national political context, to the 
politics of sector policymaking, to the politics of implementation. The case studies represent a variety 
of country contexts (Bangladesh, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Malawi and Peru), and are 
taken from four sectors– maternal and child health, basic education, agricultural marketing, and rural 
roads. These were selected both because of their intrinsic value to the livelihoods and wellbeing of 
poor people, and because they present an opportunity to consider the influence of politics in both 
‘social’ (health and education) and ‘productive’ (roads and agricultural marketing) sectors. Leftwich’s 
(2010:10) broad definition of politics is deployed – one that extends beyond formal political institutions 
to include ‘all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation over decisions about institutions 
and rules which shape how resources are used, produced and distributed’.  
 
Successful cases of service provision, or programmes that ‘work’, were selected on the basis that: a) 
they have improved the lives of poor people, as demonstrated through impact evaluation; and b) 
these results have been sustained over the long-term (minimum 5 years). These cases, as 
Bebbington and McCourt (2007) observed in their own search for ‘success’, often emerge against the 
odds, and are never wholesale triumphs. As Grindle (2005) puts it, success, like development in 
general, is a moving target. Even policies that produce good results over time may ‘go bad’ at any 
point, either by ceasing to be effective or producing unintended consequences (ibid). In reflecting on 
the findings of the programme of research by the Citizenship research centre, Benequista and 
Gaventa (2011:39) similarly concluded that even the cases that were considered successful were 
often fraught with setbacks, missteps and reversals.  
 
                                                             
6
 This finding is based on studies of new public management reforms introduced in the 1990s in four countries – Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, India and Sri Lanka 
7
 For details of the sources and search terms used in this review, see Annex 2.  
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While there are good reasons to be cautious about labelling cases as ‘successful’, there is 
nevertheless a general openness to the idea that stories of success or progress at least, can be 
useful learning tools (ODI, 2011
8
). It is notable that recent research into the politics of service 
provision has turned its attention to explaining variation and exception in the face of overwhelming 
poor performance (Booth, 2011b), identifying institutional arrangements that are comparably better at 
dealing with some of the problems that arise in public service provision (Besley and Ghatak, 2007), 
and explaining why some cases run against the general patterns of institutional failure or corruption 
(Leftwich, 2010). Like these studies, the purpose here is not to provide a blueprint for success 
elsewhere, but rather, to begin to advance a research agenda that aims to understand better what 
accounts for variations in outcomes in the face of widespread under-provision. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section identifies some of the main themes that have 
emerged from recent empirical research into the politics of service delivery. In section 3, we turn our 
attention to the main body of evidence on which this paper draws, and examine more closely the 
politics of what works using eight case studies of successful delivery taken from our focus sectors. In 
section 4, we summarise the main findings from the case studies and wider empirical literature, before 
concluding in section 5 by identifying what a systematic approach for understanding the forms of 
politics likely to underpin successful service delivery might look like in future research.  
2. The political determinants of service delivery 
 
Over the past decade or so, researchers have begun to examine the role of politics in determining 
whether, how and to whom services are provided, explicitly acknowledging that even where resource 
levels are sufficient, provision cannot be adequate if incentives are not properly aligned towards better 
outcomes (Collier, 2007). At the core of this thinking is an underlying intuition that variation in 
performance can be explained by variation in the way political institutions operate.  
 
While there have been important advances in thinking about how politics may influence service 
performance, evidence of the links between politics and actual outcomes on the ground remains 
limited. Empirical research is fragmented across multiple sectors and disciplines, largely taking the 
form of in-depth case studies that in the absence of any unifying conceptual approach or framework 
offer a limited basis for systematic, comparative analysis. Studies have tended to converge on a 
relatively narrow few aspects of politics from among the larger range of possible political factors 
influencing outcomes. A good portion of the literature has been framed around a set of assumptions 
about the conditioning role of the national political and institutional environment - largely the nature of 
the political regime and electoral cycles. The ‘micro politics’ of incentives and relationships between 
actors at the point of delivery has been relatively neglected.  
 
The brief review below outlines the main strands of current debates on the political determinants of 
service delivery, and presents some recent empirical evidence of how these affect service 
performance. 
2.1 Periods of crisis and adjustment 
 
Political institutions are shaped by wider socio-economic conditions that determine the options and 
choices of political actors (Hickey, 2007). As Grindle (2005) notes, policy change initiatives occur in 
particular economic, political, and social contexts that represent different configurations of interests, 
institutions, and actors, and the legacies of prior political interactions. Based on a review of qualitative 
                                                             
8
 A prominent recent illustration is the collection of ‘progress stories’ compiled by ODI. See: 
http://www.developmentprogress.org/global-report  
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studies of health and education reform across sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, Nelson 
(2007:87) concluded radical institutional reforms are sometimes launched in the wake of economic 
and political crises that ‘weaken or destroy established interest groups, empower new ones, and 
convince the public of the need for major change’. Economic crisis is a catalyst in bringing about 
reform, because it throws the normal rules of the game into flux (Batley, 2004:39). Case studies of 
successful implementation of social protection policies across Africa and Asia have shown that in 
several instances, reform coincided with ‘political junctures’ (e.g. elections, moments of crisis, post-
colonial settlements) that persuaded regimes to renegotiate the political settlement and social contract 
between state and citizens (Hickey, 2006).  
2.2 Variation across and within regime type 
 
The nature of the political regime has long been regarded a key determinant of the policy choices 
states make with regard to services. A good deal of research in this area has either subtly or overtly 
addressed the question of whether democratic political systems, more than other types of regime, 
generate better service coverage and quality. The case in favour is that interactions between voters 
and politicians produce greater incentives for responsive public goods provision (Birner and Resnick, 
2010). The realist view, as Harding and Wantchekon (2010) put it, is that ‘whether one pitches it as 
leaders buying support or as citizens demanding recognition, the outcome is the same: by virtue of 
elections, democracy increases the provision of public goods’. But while empirical studies have 
documented spikes in social expenditure with the advent of democracy (Sasavage, 2005; Carbone, 
2009), increased public spending does not, by itself, automatically translate into better outcomes 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2007).  
 
The impact of democracy on service provision has been shown to be contingent on the wider 
institutional context (Nelson, 2007). This is graphically illustrated by Carbone’s (2009) comparative 
analysis examining why democratisation was instrumental to the development of pro-poor health 
policies in Ghana, but failed to have similar positive effects in Cameroon. The study concludes that 
the key difference in Ghana was democratisation was accompanied by vibrant debate in the media 
and mobilised interest groups which gave opposition parties a platform to pressure the governing 
parties to respond to demands for better health. Stasavage’s  (2005) widely cited study of the impact 
of democracy on education spending in Uganda and Malawi similarly found that increased spending 
in Uganda was due to the particular salience of education in the country, coupled with public access 
to information about government policy.  
 
Studies indicate that it is not elections per se that determine incentives for the delivery of public 
goods, but the highly localised dynamics of political competition and political culture. Keefer and 
Khemani’s (2003) seminal study of so-called ‘political market imperfections’, which examined how 
information asymmetries, deep social polarisation, and the non-credibility of political promises disrupt 
the translation of citizen preferences into service outcomes, remains influential
9
. The study found 
Kerala performed relatively better in public goods provision because its voters are better informed and 
less ethnically polarized, and its political parties are able to generate credible political platforms on the 
basis of delivering broad social services. The local dynamics of political party competition are also 
implicated in Crost and Kambhampati’s (2010) comparative study of village-level education 
                                                             
9
 Information asymmetry means citizens, and particularly the poor, cannot easily assign either credit or blame for 
the quality of services delivered to individual politicians, and as a result politicians’ incentives are to under-
provide them. Deep social polarisation and ethnic fragmentation means citizens favour candidates from their own 
ethnic groups, distracting from the performance of public services. The non-credibility of political promises, based 
partly on the inability of citizens to verify them, undermines any political competition on this basis, leaving 
incumbents free to continue to underperform. 
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infrastructure in North India. This found higher rates of party turnover were directly correlated to the 
number of primary schools in a village, and the quality of its infrastructure.  
 
Regime ‘types’ do not convey the same types of incentives through government bureaucracy: hence 
there may be no direct relationship between regime type and incentives for service provision (Booth, 
2012). Research by APPP suggests top-down pressures for performance in public services are 
particularly strong where the political leadership has the capability to centralise the management of 
economic rents in the service of a long-term vision (Booth, 2012; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2009; 
Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; Kelsall, 2011). Well functioning state bureaucracies can occur along the 
spectrum of political systems, including where neo-patrimonial logics prevail. This may depend on the 
extent to which political leaders are willing to invest political capital in ‘insulating’ certain reforms from 
the normal functioning of informal political institutions. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2009) argue this 
convincingly based on a political economy analysis of the Uganda roads sector. Watson and Khan 
(2010) draw a similar conclusion in relation to education reform in Pakistan, arguing special ‘units’ can 
protect reforms from an otherwise dysfunctional climate of opaque and discretionary bureaucratic 
rules and processes. 
2.3 The source of elite incentives 
 
Understanding what drives effective service provision requires attention to the underlying incentives of 
elite decision makers (Besley and Ghatak, 2007). This need to ‘unpack’ the institutional incentives of 
political and economic elites was a key conclusion of the 10-year research programme of the Centre 
for the Future State (Unsworth, 2010)
10
. That is not to say that elites are by virtue of their position 
alone negative forces for development. Research has emphasised their incentives derive from a 
number of sources, including power base (i.e. resources and political influence in a locality or among 
a group), how they interpret poverty (i.e. ideology and knowledge), and how they translate the 
interests of their constituency into practice (i.e. capacity to implement) (Amsden, DiCaprio and 
Robinson, 2011). Elites make a difference, but we need to focus on the structures and institutions 
shaping their interests if we are to understand how the actions of individuals can be routinised 
(Unsworth, 2010; Olivier de Sardan, 2010).  
 
Pro-poor service delivery may result where political elites court the support of the poor in the service 
of their political careers. This is illustrated by Kosack’s (2009) analysis of the origins of investments in 
Education for All across different regimes in Ghana, Taiwan and Brazil. The study concluded that 
political will derived not from the leaders’ personal commitment, or from international pressure, but 
from a political imperative to respond to citizens’ demands. This imperative was strongest where the 
government needed the support of the poor to stay in power, where the poor were mobilised by a 
‘political entrepreneur’ able to push forward their demands, and where the interests of private capital 
were to reduce the price of skilled labour. A recent study by Rosser, Wilson and Sulistiyanto (2011) 
found a similar dynamic with regard to health policies in Indonesia. It showed that where district heads 
actively pursued ‘political entrepreneurship’ over the long-term – i.e. developing and then relying on a 
popular support base among the poor in order to stay in power - they were more likely to promote free 
public services. Hence, as Hickey (2006:vii) observed in relation to social protection, pro-poor policies 
may emerge at particular moments when the interests of private and political actors converge with the 
interests of poor groups.  
 
The long-held view that individual actors act as ‘champions’ able to somehow single-handedly 
galvanise pro-poor change is increasingly being tempered by a recognition that the capacity of 
individual actors derives from the alliances and coalitions in which they are embedded. These 
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 Where elites are defined as: ‘a distinct group within a society which enjoys privileged status and exercises decisive control over the 
organization of society’ (Amsden, DiCaprio and Robinson, 2011)  
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alliances in turn determine individual actors’ room for manoeuvre, and the resources they can 
mobilise. As Unsworth (2010:38) puts it, ‘it is the way networks of relationships between public and 
private actors are configured that shapes their ability to influence reforms, not the characteristics of 
individual actors’. Accordingly, research by the Developmental Leadership Programme is examining 
leadership not in the personalised sense, but as a political process involving the skills of mobilising 
people and resources in pursuit of a set of shared and negotiated goals (Leftwich, 2010).
11
 Others 
have noted that leaders grow out of the coalitions that they personify; they do not float freely above 
them (Bebbington and McCourt, 2006). Grindle (2005) asserts that whether or not leaders are able to 
undermine the existing ‘political equilibrium’ (of interests) around a policy depends both on the reform 
context and the strategies actors deploy - in other words, on both structural factors and actors’ 
agency. Structure and agency need not be seen as being in opposition. As Mcloughlin and Batley 
(2011) argue based on studies of collaboration between government and non-government service 
providers in South Asia, the strategies most likely to succeed are those that are based on an 
understanding of existing structures and how they may present not only constraints but also 
opportunities for influence. 
2.4 Alliances, networks and collective action 
 
Services are often understood, at the conceptual level, as the product of processes of state-society 
bargaining (Unsworth, 2010) or of an elusive underlying ‘political equilibrium’ (or social contract) 
between elites and different interest groups in society (Walton, 2010). A major strand of research has 
been concerned with the conditions under which citizens can collectively organise to press for broad-
based provision, and therefore challenge service exclusion. But whether or not citizen engagement 
can influence policy choices is seen as dependent on a range of factors, including the political 
context, the relative capacities of actors, and the history and style of engagement between them, as 
well as the nature of the service being addressed.
12
  
 
There are of course prominent cases where citizen pressure has been successful in influencing the 
state’s policy choices. In-depth examinations of the well-documented case of citizen engagement in 
the health sector in Brazil continue to demonstrate that strong mobilisation around participatory 
institutions has promoted a more equitable distribution of healthcare. Coelho’s (2011) comparative 
study of Local Health Councils in São Paulo found local institutions were more effective where 
powerful social actors could connect them into to a wider network of social organizations and political, 
governmental, and health institutions, in order to press for and negotiate the demands made by the 
forums through these connections. Another factor in more successful cases is the alignment of public 
managers, civil society representatives and political parties around an ideological commitment to 
popular participation (Benequista and Gaventa, 2011).  
 
Drawing on case studies in India, Brazil and Mexico, the Centre for the Future State has documented 
successful cases of reform that have relied in part on broad-based alliances that transcend the public-
private divide (if such a divide exists) and bring together key actors with common interests.
13
 
Unsworth (2010:45) describes this process as ‘a form of embedded autonomy’. A recent study in 
Greater Durban illustrated how inclusive elite coalitions between political leaders, traditional leaders, 
elected councillors, businessmen, social activists and the church were able to break down social 
antagonisms and push for inclusive social provisioning (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009).  
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 See: http://www.dlprog.org/   
12
 The Citizenship DRC lists the ‘six factors’ that influence the outcomes of citizen participation as: prior citizen capabilities; institutional 
and political context; the strength of internal champions; the location of power and decision-making; the history and style of engagement, 
and the nature of the issue (Benequista and Gaventa, 2011: 40) 
13
 Benequista and Gaventa (2011:39) stress that in practice the boundaries between state and society are often blurred. 
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2.5 Top-down ‘versus’ bottom-up accountability 
 
The debate about the relative merits of top-down ‘versus’ bottom-up accountability in underpinning 
service performance is pervasive in the literature on service performance. Research by the APPP 
indicates the success or failure of service delivery systems is related to the extent of top-down 
discipline and motivation, whether the framework for provision reflects a coherent vision, and the 
types of corporate performance disciplines in place (Booth, 2010:4-5).
14
 Enquires into what drives 
‘pockets of productivity’ and ‘islands of effectiveness’ draws similar conclusions (Leonard, 2008; 
Crook, 2010). Leonard (2008), for example, argues productivity is more likely where administrative 
leadership is depoliticised but responsive to political leadership. Other recent studies have found 
considerable merit in accountability from below. In their rigorous study of the Ugandan health sector, 
Björkman and Svensson (2007) showed that ‘bottom up’ community monitoring can play an important 
role in improving service delivery when traditional top-down supervision is ineffective. Nevertheless, 
as Gaventa and Barett (2010) point out, such effects are highly context-dependent, and similar 
studies have found no such impact.  
 
Some are beginning to conclude that citizen engagement in accountability –or social accountability – 
may be more effective when combined with top-down accountability (Joshi, 2012). Crook (2010: 79) 
argues that ‘pressure from the public for better performance is only likely to work if the need to 
respond is incorporated into organisational incentive structures’. In other words, real change may be 
more likely where there are enabling conditions on ‘both sides of the equation’ – that is, where citizen 
pressure and political will combine to produce incentives for delivery (Benequista and Gaventa, 
2011:39).  
 
Even in the absence of formal democratic accountability (i.e. the long-route), citizens can bring to 
bear informal, reputation-based controls over public officials. Tsai’s (2007) widely-cited study of 316 
villages across rural China found that even though formal accountability mechanisms were weak, 
local officials had a strong incentive to provide public goods where citizens were able to award them 
moral standing for doing so. The study found higher levels of public goods provision in villages where 
solidarity groups that were ‘encompassing’ (open to everyone) and ‘embedded’ (incorporate local 
officials) were able to make local officials hold to their public obligations through informal sanction. 
Hossain (2010) reaches similar conclusions from a study in Bangladesh. She highlights that ‘rude’ 
forms of accountability – or forms of accountability that depend on the power of social norms and 
rules to influence and sanction official performance  - were particularly salient because of the prestige 
and financial incentives associated with holding public office in the country. She concludes that 
effective accountability relationships can be ‘embedded in social relations and political pressures that 
are unofficial, informal and personalized’ (ibid:924).  
 
Social accountability may be more effective where it is genuinely locally-anchored, and builds on a 
culture of citizen participation. Singh and Kaushal’s (2009) study of co-productive relationships 
between the state and traditional authorities in the provision of public goods and services in Nagaland 
found arrangements worked because they combined strong state-level backing and an enabling legal 
framework with local customs of consensus-building around collective problems. APPP has provided 
illustrative examples of the role of ‘locally anchored problem solving’ in service delivery; that is, small-
scale, locally-generated initiatives that make use of local resources and derive their legitimacy from 
‘local cultural repertoires’ (or ‘views on what is important and how to get things done’) (Booth, 
2011a:19). As Booth (2011a:17) explains, these arrangements often locate modern professional 
standards within the local moral economy. In some contexts, institutional innovations work when they 
build constructively on what already exists and are based on practical norms (ibid). Market-place co-
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production in Sierra Leone worked because relationships were based on reciprocal exchange, parties 
recognised their mutual dependence, and there was immediate sanction for failures of reciprocity 
(Workman’s, 2011). Hence, moral reciprocity is a form of accountability, even when these 
relationships appear on the surface to be patrimonial (Hickey, 2006:vii). 
2.6 Sector and reform characteristics 
 
Different sectors have particular characteristics that determine their political salience, the incentives 
for politicians to deliver them, the main actors and interests surrounding them, and the ways that 
citizens can mobilise around them. They present different opportunities for political returns: As Keefer 
and Khemani (2003) have argued, there is now ‘ample evidence’ politicians have greater incentives to 
provide narrowly targetable goods, such as infrastructure provision, rather than improvements in 
broad public services
15
. Mani and Mukand (2007) add another dimension, finding incentives also vary 
according to the ‘visibility’ of certain goods (where visibility increases the likelihood elites will be 
credited). Calculations of returns may not only determine whether the state provides a service but 
how the state engages in its production. As Pritchett (2002) argues, regimes have incentives to 
directly produce education because it is the best means of directly controlling and monitoring the 
inculcation of beliefs. 
Sector characteristics may also influence power relations between service users and providers, or 
principals (citizens and their political representatives) and agents (politicians, officials and 
professional groups, provider organizations). Studies across Africa and Asia analysed the relative 
power of principals and agents according to whether a service is producer or consumer oriented, the 
degree to which users are defined territorially, the level of information and choice citizens have in 
using the service, and the measurability of performance (Batley, 2004:45). They found that compared 
with users of agricultural marketing services and urban water supply, users of curative health services 
had relatively little choice, little information about how to exercise it, and little capacity to organize 
(ibid). Likewise, Keefer and Khemani (2003:2) argue political market imperfections are greatest in the 
education and health sectors, where information asymmetry is chronic, and citizens cannot easily 
evaluate the quality and efficiency of services.  
Different types of reform are also likely to attract different types of politics. Kaufman and Nelson 
(2004) distinguish ‘piecemeal’ reforms that entail relatively small steps and may fall under the political 
radar but nevertheless have important cumulative effects, from larger initiatives that aim to extensively 
alter the structure and organization of delivery systems. Their studies of education and health reform 
across Latin America show that whilst ambitious plans carry higher risks of provoking political 
opposition, a more incremental approach may fail to sustain its own momentum (ibid:5). In the health 
sector, programmes that created new stakeholders or addressed obvious equity goals without 
disrupting established interests were more sustainable than reforms that made new demands or 
altered existing procedures: on the whole, equity-oriented reforms were generally easier to implement 
than efficiency-oriented reforms (ibid:50, 62). This view is supported by Grindle (2005) who in 
reference to the education sector in Latin America observes that while reforms to increase access 
were relatively easy because they increased the size and power of unions, quality reforms that 
emphasised performance evaluation and reorganisation upset the political equilibrium of actors, 
interests and agents and met with fierce opposition. Overall, the literature is clear that anticipation of 
resistance from interest groups may in some cases explain why some reforms are pursued and others 
are not, and why politicians often revert to ‘popular’ policies.
16
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A recent study by Khemani (2010) suggests swing voters in local jurisdictions provide greater vote returns when allocated private 
transfers such as jobs, cash, subsidies, and in-kind transfers, instead of broad public goods such as quality health and education.  
16
 Grindle also makes the point that strategic decision-makers anticipate the sources of resistance and calculate to out-manoeuvre them. 
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2.7 Modes of provision  
 
The particular ‘mode of provision’ - in other words, who the principal actors are, and their respective 
roles and accountabilities - also influences incentives at the point of delivery, and may determine the 
opportunities for collective action. Modes of provision – or forms of direct delivery by government, 
contracting (whether to contract in external support or to contract out whole functions), collaboration 
and co-production - have been analysed according to how roles of ownership, stewardship, financing, 
delivery, and accountability are distributed between state actors, non-state providers and citizens or 
users (Batley and Larbi 2004, Balabanova 2008). Recent research on social accountability in India, 
Brazil and Mexico, for example, has shown that the arrangements for implementation ‘substantially 
influence the opportunities for collective actors to organise, influence policy, and hold service 
providers accountable’ (Unsworth, 2010: 38)
17
.  
But there are limitations to simple classifications of ‘modes’ of provision, and recent research is 
increasingly exposing what has probably always been the reality - that in practice, services and public 
goods are often generated through formal and informal collaborations across increasingly blurred 
public/private boundaries, that these can occur spontaneously, and that they are often highly elusive 
and informal (Olivier de Sardan, 2010). Services are not monopolistic (Olivier de Sardan, 2010), they 
are often hybrids that do not fit with the ideal types (Joshi and Moore, 2004), and might more typically 
take the form of ‘complex co-production’ (Booth, 2011a). Whether or not public services are delivered 
effectively depends on the precise terms on which collaboration occurs, the co-ordination between 
actors, and the personal relationships between them. One study in Niger describes how different 
modes may involve different types of particular accountabilities between individuals and institutions, 
and different opportunities for general accountability to the citizens/users (Olivier de Sardan, 2010). 
As intimated earlier, some consider that it is not modes per se that drive better or worse public goods 
provision, but the specific mechanisms that exist to overcome problems of collective action (Kelsall, 
2009). 
 
A relatively small body of literature has examined the dynamics of relationships between state and 
non-state actors collaborating in producing public goods and services. This research has illustrated 
how the balance of power and relative autonomy of the actors at the point of delivery is a product of 
the broader political and institutional environment, the history of state-NGO relations, and the nature 
of the political regime (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010:135). These factors influence the way the 
relationship is organised – both formally and informally – and the actors’ respective room for 
manoeuvre (Mcloughlin, 2011). For example, Batley (2011) and Rose (2011) have found that effective 
and enduring - less brittle - forms of collaboration between government and non-government service 
providers seem to arise where the relationship has evolved rather than been created, rests on mutual 
agreement, and preserve the financial autonomy of partners. 
3. Case studies of the politics of what works 
 
While there is consensus that politics may enable or constrain service provision, the empirical 
evidence remains limited, and it is difficult to get a sense of how the various aspects of politics 
identified in the wider literature might interact and determine outcomes in any one given case. This 
section examines eight cases of ‘successful’ implementation – as measured by independent 
evaluation of impact – and traces the aspects of politics that have been considered important 
determinants of progress. In so far as the literature allows, the cases highlight the influence of political 
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 Collective action was often weakened by lack of focus point, physical or otherwise, around which to mobilise. For instance, cash transfer 
programmes in Mexico were deliberately designed to bypass civil society intermediaries that were seen as corrupt, cutting off the focus 
point for collective actors to mobilise (Unsworth, 2010, 39). 
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institutions, actors and incentives at the local, sector and national level. The aim is to consider politics 
more holistically. 
 
In addition to the main criteria of evidence of measurable results (i.e independent evaluation), 
sustained over the medium term (five years), the case study selection aims to represent a range of 
modes of provision - from direct state delivery, to contracting, to co-production and state-NGO 
collaborations. In practice, no case fits neatly into a single category, partly because the complexity of 
organisational arrangements is not often captured in the literature, and partly because a particular 
service may be provided through bundles of modes operating at different levels or points in the 
production and delivery process. Though the cases are taken from a diverse range of countries, as 
table 1 shows, they were not selected for the purpose of illustrating contrasting country contexts.
18
  
 
Table 1. Selected case studies of the politics of what works 
 
Sector 
 
Country Mode of delivery
19
 
Maternal and child 
health 
Rwanda Performance-based financing 
 
Bangladesh Decentralised state provision 
 
Basic education Ghana Complementary (State-NGO collaboration) 
 
Ethiopia Decentralised state provision 
 
Rural roads Indonesia Decentralised state provision 
 
Peru Contracting out 
 
Agricultural marketing Malawi State-run  
 
Ghana State-run 
 
3.1 Performance-based financing in maternal and child health in Rwanda 
 
A number of sources have recently drawn attention to the remarkable progress made in the Rwandan 
health sector since 1994 (Pose and Samuels, 2011a; Basinga et al, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2009). 
Although the genocide virtually destroyed the country’s health infrastructure, available data indicates 
most health indicators have been restored to pre-genocide levels, and Rwanda is on track to meet the 
child and maternal health MDGs. Maternal mortality decreased dramatically between 2000-2005 
(30%), as did under five and infant mortality between 2005-2007 (32% and 28%, respectively). 
Progress is expected to continue as the number of women giving birth in health facilities is increasing 
(Pose and Samuels, 2011a:11,15-16).  
 
The scale and timing of Rwanda’s progress on health is seen as intimately connected to the 
exceptional context of the post-genocide period and the nature of the ensuing post-war political 
settlement. Progress on health sector reform in Rwanda can be traced along the same timeline as 
wider processes of stabilisation and social reconciliation in the country (Pose and Samuels, 2011a). 
Planning was initially hampered by a period of stagnation in the late 1990s, during which time the 
interim Government of National Unity was reliant on emergency humanitarian aid and the country 
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 It is notable that none of the cases are from among the group of fragile and conflict affected states, and that, as one reviewer 
commented, other studies from South America could have been included.  
19
 These are the dominant aspects that distinguish these cases, although other modes are going on within them.  
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characterised by sporadic conflict. Once political reconstruction began in the early 2000s, reforms 
began to be designed and piloted, and national-level implementation got underway after the first 
multiparty elections of 2003 (Ibid, 2011:7).  
 
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011:15) argue that the shock and challenge to national survival 
presented by the genocide helped install a leadership determined to pursue nation-building, noting 
that President Kagame is widely regarded as ‘both visionary and determined to the point of 
ruthlessness’. They characterise the regime since 2000 as a form of ‘developmental patrimonialism’, 
whereby the ruling elite has successfully centralised rents and deployed them in the pursuit of a long 
term vision. Free from the need to create rents to generate political support, policy has been driven 
almost exclusively by a genuine commitment to economic and social development as an antidote to a 
legacy of ethnic division (ibid). The near-complete destruction of infrastructure and human capital may 
even have enabled policy innovation free from the constraints of a historically entrenched system 
(Morgan, 2010). 
 
At the technical level, Rwanda’s achievements in health are seen as partly attributed to the 
Performance Based Financing (PBF) initiative – a form of ‘contracting in’ piloted in 2002 and rolled out 
nationally in 2006
20
. This initiative provides financial incentives to publicly and NGO-managed district 
hospitals to improve their performance against quality and use indicators (Pose and Samuels, 2011a). 
Central government acts in a stewardship role, but the initiative receives financial and technical 
contributions from the World Bank, WHO, and number of bilateral aid agencies.
21
 A recent multi-donor 
impact evaluation across 166 districts found improvements in both the use and quality of maternal 
and child health services as a result of the initiative (Basinga et al, 2011). 
 
Echoing wider observations about the role of determined leadership in Rwanda’s broader 
developmental success, several authors note that strong political leadership, from the President down 
to village-level, has been a critical impetus for health reform in the post-genocide period (Pose and 
Samuels, 2011a; Brinkerhoff, 2009). High-level backing from the Rwandan government was 
cemented in 2006 only after rigorous evaluations demonstrated the initiative could have positive 
impacts on outcomes (Soeters et al. 2006). The government’s will and firm commitment enabled it to 
push the initiative forward in spite of an initial cool response from donors (Morgan, 2010). The 
capacity to assertively engage donors is indicative of Rwanda’s reputation as able to pursue its own 
agenda, acting as a ‘true partner’ and encouraging the co-ordination of aid at central and local levels 
(Pose and Samuels, 2011). Strong top-down incentives also feature prominently in accounts of the 
success of performance based financing in Rwanda. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011:16) argue the 
Rwandan civil service scores highly on vertical coordination and technocratic integrity. Furthermore, 
the legitimacy and integrity of the Rwandan regime, evidenced in the complete absence of high-level 
political corruption, affords it considerable moral authority (ibid).  
 
Rwanda has been described as an example of how formal standard setting, evaluation and feedback 
mechanisms can be successfully deployed alongside more traditional, culturally embedded means of 
enforcing contracts, accountability and obligations (Pose and Samuels, 2011a). Part of the 
government’s moral authority derives from strategic revival of the deeply embedded cultural values of 
imihigo and guhiga, which require mayors, village chiefs, local leaders and civil servants to sign 
annual performance contracts on which they have to swear an oath (ibid). Some have observed 
synergy between this wider emphasis on performance, which Brinkerhoff (2009) describes as ‘front 
and centre’ in the Rwandan public sector, and the success of PBF. At the technical level, Meesen et 
al (2006) note that deploying values and social norms of integrity and honesty lowers the transaction 
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 The approach is sometimes referred to as ‘paying for performance’ (P4P). 
21
 Funding is coordinated through an Inter-Agency Working Groups on Results Based Financing, affiliated to the International Health 
Partnership (Kalk et al, 2010). 
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costs of command and control mechanisms like PBF.  
3.2 Decentralised maternal and child health in Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh has achieved what the World Bank (2005) has described as a ‘spectacular rate of 
progress’ on health indicators since its independence in 1971, most notably in reducing fertility, but 
also in increasing the use of antenatal and postnatal care. Pose and Samuels (2011b) similarly cite 
‘extraordinary improvements’ in infant and maternal mortality in the country, including a 44% decline 
in the maternal mortality rate between 1990-2001 (Mridha et al, 2009:1). This progress has occurred 
alongside substantial growth in health infrastructure: from a very low base of virtually no health 
facilities at independence, to now substantial numbers of district hospitals and local community clinics 
(Mridha et al, 2009). Successive five year plans have shifted services from a narrow urban-based 
delivery system to a more broad-based rural programme capable of reaching vulnerable groups (Pose 
and Samuels, 2011), though differences in access between regions and between ethnic and 
socioeconomic groups remain (Mridha et al, 2009; World Bank 2005; Hossain and Osman, 2007). 
 
Several observers note success in Bangladesh is surprising given the country’s poor record on 
governance and the prevalence of corruption (Mridha et al, 2009; Pose and Samuels, 2011b). 
Electoral competition and the political capital to be gained from service provision have played an 
important role in driving social sector reform. A stable post-independence political settlement, coupled 
with predictable and consistent patterns of elite competition and cooperation enabled commitment to 
prioritising maternal and child health in spite of a swathe of changes in government (Hossain and 
Osman, 2007; Pose and Samuels, 2011b ;Parks and Cole, 2010). As Hossain and Osman (2007:39) 
note, strong party competition between 1991 and 2006 made successive ruling parties scale-up their 
commitments to health in order to outbid their predecessor. This is mirrored in increased party control 
over the distribution of resources at local level (ibid). Since the 1980s, politicians have perceived 
support for social spending as a political win-win that provides political credit alongside business 
opportunities (Mahmud et al, 2008). 
 
Electoral politics may also have determined the nature of the reforms undertaken in Bangladesh, 
based on the type of popular support they have been able to attract. Hossain and Osman  (2007) 
argue achievements made during the 1990s were mainly limited to improvements in access – a type 
of reform seen as broadly aligned with the governance status quo, not likely to be technically 
demanding or disrupt political interests, and popular with citizens, service-providers (specifically 
doctors), elites and the donor community. Mahmud et al (2008) concur that successive governments 
have pursued the path of least confrontation, adopting reforms that were relatively easy wins 
accomplished by ‘a stroke of the pen’. It is noted, however, that since the 2000s, much-needed quality 
reforms have yet to make it onto the policy table, reflecting the difficulties of engaging the well-
organised professional public servants whose political clout has been strengthened through 
expansion in the sector (Hossain and Osman, 2007). 
Public health in Bangladesh is delivered through a tiered structure of facilities at tertiary (division) 
secondary (district) and upazila (sub-district) levels. While there are no available country-wide 
evaluations of the decentralised mode of provision, Faguet and Ali’s (2009) micro-level study of health 
outcomes across two upazilas - one successful, one unsuccessful – provides an insight into the local 
structural, political and institutional factors that may account for the variation in indicators across 
localities. This study showed that in order to understand success and failure in public service delivery, 
we need to dig down beneath the ‘rules of the game’: that is, to look beyond the organizations, 
institutions and informal rules and conventions that govern incentives, to examine the underlying 
beliefs, understandings and dispositions that drive behaviour. While the health ‘hardware’ 
(infrastructure, administration, staff) of the two upazilas was similar, the successful upazila was in 
closer proximity to the capital, had a history of sustained NGO involvement, and a relatively open, 
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tolerant religious tradition. Even more important than these structural factors, Faguet and Ali (2009) 
argue, was the ability of ‘local leaders’ to promote changes in health behaviours. This was made 
possible because they were embedded in a dense ‘web of relationships’ between citizens, legal 
authorities and service providers that conferred on them local authority and legitimacy, making the 
local population more susceptible to their messages. This network of relationships also underpinned a 
higher degree of accountability by public servants. Hence the conclusion that if services are to 
respond to a population’s particular - and changing - needs, and be credible in the eyes of the 
population, the elected representatives of that population should be involved in their production 
(Faguet and Ali, 2009:216).  
3.3 Complementary basic education in Ghana 
 
Ghana has made substantial progress in increasing access to basic education since the post-colonial 
period: the net enrolment ratio in primary school increased from 60% to 77% between 1999-2008 
(UNESCO, 2011:117). In spite of this achievement, the 2011 Education Monitoring Report warns that 
the country is unlikely to meet its MDG targets without a substantial increase in aid (UNESCO, 2011). 
Enrolments remain well below the Education for All (EFA) goals, and completion rates are 
problematic, with only 63% of children making it to their fifth year of primary school (Little, 2010:44). 
Progress has levelled off since the early 2000s, partly because of the difficulties of reaching the last 
20% of primary age children, particularly in the north of the country, where the great majority of 
children do not complete the compulsory nine years of primary education (Little, 2010; Casey-Hayford 
and Hartwell, 2010:529). 
 
Studies have analysed the relationship between Ghana’s uneven progress on education over the past 
three decades, and the level of ‘political will’ exhibited by successive regimes (Little, 2010; Pedley and 
Taylor, 2009; Kosak, 2009). These provide similar accounts of why the country invested relatively 
more in primary education in the periods before 1966 and after 1986, whereas the intervening period 
was characterised by structural decline. Governments that prioritised access to education – namely, 
under the Convention People’s Party (CPP) (1951-1965) and the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) (1982-92) – were driven by a need to actively court the support of the masses (Little, 
2010; Pedley and Taylor, 2009). Kosack (2009) develops this further, arguing fluctuating levels of 
political will correlate with whether or not two ‘vital constituencies’ in education reform - poor families 
and employers -  were mobilised by a ‘political entrepreneur’.  
 
Against this background of inconsistent progress, resource constraints and the continuing challenge 
of reaching underserved populations, the importance of complementary education in Ghana is 
increasingly being recognised (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). The School for Life (SfL) 
programme, piloted and rolled out across the north of the country since 1995, is considered one of the 
few successful examples of complementary education (Rose, 2009). The programme provides 
accelerated learning to underserved populations through a form of co-production whereby formal 
organisations and communities or service recipients both make resource contributions. Teachers are 
recruited from within the community, trained by the Ghana Education Service (GES), and paid by the 
community in food, small amounts of cash or household labour
22
. A recent impact assessment found 
SfL reached 85,000 children and over 4000 rural communities across 12 districts, with close to 90% of 
these children completing the programme and become functionally literate, and almost 70% 
transitioning to the formal education system at upper primary levels. The integration of SfL students 
into the formal system has had a positive impact on the overall gross enrolment rate for public primary 
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schools in the north
23
. The programme also improved gender equality (at least 40% of those enrolled 
in SfL were female) (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).   
 
A supportive government-NGO relationship may be an important enabling factor in the overall 
success and sustainability of SfL. The programme is managed through collaborative arrangements 
between donors, non-state actors and government agencies. While it is exclusively donor-funded, 
government has been encouraging in its stewardship role, increasingly recognising the contribution of 
complementary education at the policy level since 2003 (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). The 
legitimacy of SfL has been acknowledged at the lowest tiers of government, and in turn SfL has 
influenced the state sector’s notions of quality provision. Rose (2009:230) notes that experience in 
Ghana is indicative of a wider pattern whereby governments are happy to include NGO provision in 
education plans provided the provision is supported by external resources rather than competing with 
formal government schooling. Batley and Mcloughlin (2010:144-145) argue that this type of informal 
mutual agreement, based on independent contributions by the partners and non-hierarchic 
relationships between them, allows for joint learning, relies on the accumulation of human capital, and 
may extend through processes of imitation, example and institutional replication . 
3.4 Decentralised basic education in Ethiopia 
 
Despite being one of the most educationally disadvantaged countries in the world, Ethiopia has 
achieved a ‘rapid and equitable’ expansion of access to primary education since the end of the civil 
war in 1991 (Engel, 2011). The 2011 Global Monitoring Report observes the country now has a real 
prospect of achieving Universal Primary Education by 2015, having reduced the number of children 
out of school from 6.5 million to 2.7 million from 1999 to 2008 (UNESCO, 2011). Notwithstanding 
continuing concerns over quality, there is evidence that this rapid expansion has been accompanied 
by reductions in geographic and socioeconomic inequalities in access (in particular, a narrowing of 
the gender gap), alongside growing rates of primary school completion (Teshome, 2008; Engel, 
2011).  
The literature examining the progress made in education in Ethiopia draws attention to the strong 
ideological commitment to pro-poor reform and equality of access reform exhibited by the ruling 
political party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).  This ideology is 
linked to the party’s military history, its experience of mass mobilisation in resistance to the Dergue, 
and the fact that the poor are its key political constituency (Brown and Teshome, 2007). The political 
legitimacy of the EPRDF rests on its identity as a ‘vanguard movement of the poor’, and education 
has been regarded by as a central pillar of a post-war nation-building project, and a means of 
addressing past sources of instability (Enge, 2011:14). Successive education policies have been 
‘loaded’ with references to democratic values, human rights and citizenship, and aimed ‘to produce 
good citizens who understand, respect and defend the constitution’ (Teshome’s, 2008:58).  
Decentralisation in Ethiopia has been seen as central to the ruling party’s because it has helped 
resolve struggles for power and resources between ethnic political elites, and accommodate the 
various ethnic groups’ specific geographical features, economic activity and social and cultural values 
(Chanie, 2007 and Engel, 2011). In the education sector, central government finances services and 
retains control over the curriculum but devolves planning, standard setting and accreditation, 
evaluation, monitoring and allocating local discretionary budgets to woreda education offices (Garcia 
and Rajkumar, 2008)
24
. In spite of sub-optimal arrangements for funding, planning and role allocation, 
decentralisation has improved service delivery, and disproportionately favoured poorer, more remote, 
food insecure, and pastoral areas, narrowing the gap in attainment between disadvantaged and 
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 Specifically, the evaluation found that SfL increased access to primary education by 14% in the North; from a gross enrolment  rate of 
69%, to 83% (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). 
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 Levels of government in Ethiopia are: zones, woredas (districts) and kebeles (community councils) (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008). 
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better-off woreda (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008:ix). While acknowledging the problems in attributing 
sector outcomes to decentralisation, it has coincided with steeper upward trends in a number of 
education indicators (Dom and Lister, 2010:51).  
 
There are mixed signals about the relative roles of top-down versus bottom-up accountability and 
participation in the decentralised system of education in Ethiopia. On the one hand, Brown and 
Teshome (2007:45) argue that the ruling party’s Marxist roots which underlie its commitment to pro-
poor policymaking have engendered a top-down, command approach to implementation. 
Decentralisation has been tempered by strong top-down constraints on local government autonomy 
(Dom and Lister, 2010). Intergovernmental transfers in practice centre on informal, patron-client 
relations characterised by an imbalance of power between strong central and weaker regional political 
parties. These dynamics sustain upward accountability, central domination and regional fiscal 
dependence (Chanie, 2007: 361).  
 
Other studies indicate that decentralisation in Ethiopia has generated positive social capital and 
collective action around services. It has allowed woredas to raise local awareness of national 
strategies and more effectively mobilize community participation and resources (Engel, 2010; Dom 
and Lister, 2010). Community contributions frequently make up between 10 and 20% of the woreda 
budget (Garcia and Rajkumar, 2008, cited in Engel, 2011:20). The government’s decision to allow 
teaching to be delivered in local languages, using locally relevant curricula, may have contributed to 
more active participation in the teaching-learning process (Engel: 2010:18). But while there may be 
gains in terms of increased local pride, self-identity and social capital, the impact of education policy 
on long-term national unity remains unknown (Smith, 2008). 
3.5 Decentralised rural roads in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia has recently been lauded as a democratic success story, having in a relatively short time 
made the transition from a centralised authoritarian regime to a democratic state that has pursued 
what Harris and Foresti (2011) describe as an aggressive programme of ‘big bang decentralisation’. 
While problems of corruption and neo-patrimonialism remain pervasive, decentralisation is considered 
to have enabled progress towards increased accountability, as well as allowing citizens to express 
their preferences in the delivery of public goods at the local level (ibid). 
 
As part of ongoing decentralisation reforms, the Indonesian government has adopted what is 
considered an innovative approach to the provision of small scale infrastructure and rural roads 
development under the national Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) (World Bank, 2010)
25
. In 
this community-driven development approach, central government devolves an annual block grant to 
sub-districts to fund infrastructure projects chosen by villages, of which roads are the most popular 
(Olken, 2010). Projects are facilitated and managed by local NGOs, which are responsible for 
managing funds, sourcing materials from the private sector, and building roads with local labour 
(Guggenheim et al, 2004). Available data indicate that by October 2009, the programme had built or 
rehabilitated over 62,000 kilometres of roads, with wider positive impacts in reducing household 
vulnerability and decreasing unemployment (World Bank, 2010). Evaluations have found the technical 
quality of the vast majority of the infrastructure to be ‘good’ to ‘very good’, the method of building more 
cost effective than equivalent government contracts, and the roads to be well maintained by 
communities (Olken, 2010; Guggenheim, 2004).  
There is some consensus that the incentives for the post-1998 democratic state to adopt a 
community-driven approach to development derived in part from the underlying socio-economic 
conditions in the country (World Bank, 2010; Guggenheim et al, 2004; Chowdhury et al, 2009). In 
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analysing the origins of the KDP in particular, experts emphasise that the context of rural poverty, 
political upheaval and financial crisis – namely, the East Asia crisis and the sudden downfall of 
President Suharto – weakened the appeal of a centralised state and provided an impetus for 
government to deliver programmes that could ‘bypass the graft-prone top layers of government’ in an 
effort to ‘increase the people’s trust’ (Guggenheim et al, 2004). The KDP was not an entirely new 
mode of delivery, but was able to build on pre-existing institutions for local participation (ibid). The 
political appeal of this form of direct transfer is that they have an immediate and visible impact on 
recipients, and can be ‘pitched’ as confirmation of the government’s commitment to poverty reduction 
(Chowdhury et al, 2009).  
The success and sustainability of the KDP model may be at least partly attributable to its demand-led, 
participatory nature (World Bank, 2010; Guggenheim et al, 2004; Chowdhury et al, 2009). According 
to the World Bank, the participation of women and poor people in the programme has been high 
(average 45% and 60% respectively) (World Bank, 2010). Gibson and Woolcock (2008) found that in 
the KDP’s deliberative forums, rights-based claim making was the preferred ‘currency of exchange’, 
and allowed marginalised groups to challenge elite dominance over decision-making. Olken’s (2010) 
study of the effects of participation in the programme across 49 villages concluded participation 
increased the programme’s legitimacy (i.e. the type of project selected). Specifically, people saw 
decisions as more legitimate, regardless of whether the outcome matched their preference, if they 
were reached by direct democracy as opposed to a deliberative meeting (ibid).  
 
Bottom up and top-down controls over corruption have arguably operated well together in the case of 
the KDP, to different effect. One study concluded that whereas citizen engagement was able to act as 
an effective check on the potential for shirking by community labourers, it was not an effective check 
on missing materials - only increased government audits were able to reduce ‘missing’ expenditures 
(Olken’s (2010). Grassroots monitoring was only effective where there are limited free rider problems 
and limited elite capture (ibid). Guggenheim et al (2004) argue that strong top-down control and joint 
government-World Bank monitoring at local level helped curb the potential for elite capture, noting the 
collaborative local effort between the Ministry of Home Affairs and local community NGOs in exposing 
corrupt officials. These observations chime with the findings of studies of accountability systems 
across other sectors which indicate that success requires a combination of bottom up and top-down 
pressure (Unsworth, 2010). 
 
3.6 Contracting out rural roads in Peru 
 
Peru has recently made significant progress in improving access to roads in rural and mountainous 
areas, where some of the country’s most vulnerable populations live. Since 1995, the Peru Rural 
Roads Program (PCR) - a national programme run by government and jointly funded by the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank - has rehabilitated and maintained some 15,000km of 
rural roads and 7,000km of paths (used primarily by women and children) (McSweeny and Remy, 
2008). A number of evaluations have demonstrated improvements in local economic productivity and 
increased investments in health and education as a result of the program (Valdivia, 2010). A 2005 
study found an 8% increase in school enrolment, a 55% increase in number of visits to health centres, 
a 16% increase in use of agricultural land, and a 20% increase in rural household income (Simatovic, 
2008:7). The programme has also particularly increased women’s access to markets and school 
enrollment (Bravo, 2002).  
 
Much of the literature attributes the success of the PCR to a number of ‘innovative’ institutional design 
characteristics that set the right incentives for the agents (Valdivia, 2010). Under the programme, 
local governments and communities identify priority projects according to local demand. Women and 
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men are consulted separately to enable women to make their voices heard. The local government 
then issues performance-based contracts to Routine Road Maintenance Microenterprises (MEMVRs), 
formed by local people, to carry out the required work
26
. The state requires that at least 30% of the 
employees of the MEMVRs be women, reflecting a broader commitment to gender equality, as seen 
at national level in the gender quota for political candidates (Simatovic, 2008). Several authors have 
argued that the PCR’s inclusive mode of provision has enabled genuine local ownership, helped 
insulate it from local capture, and ultimately underlies its sustainability (Simatovic, 2008; Valdivia, 
2010). Valdivia (2010) argues the programme has avoided corruption because outputs are highly 
observable, and because monitoring is carried out jointly by local government and community 
associations. McSweeny and Remy (2008) point out that the MEMVRs have incentives to be 
accountable and to perform well because they are formed from, and embedded in, local communities 
that live close to the road, and therefore have a direct stake in maintaining them. In this way, the case 
supports the point made elsewhere that accountability may work best when it is genuinely locally-
anchored. 
 
The decentralised mode of road provision in Peru, and in particular the mainstreaming of citizen 
participation and the engagement of local users in their maintenance, has been described as 
increasing political participation, strengthening democracy and civil society, improving local 
management skills, aiding political inclusion, and increasing citizen’s trust in the state (Simatovic, 
2008:3). Other accounts reveal more contested relationships between the state and the local 
community. Wilson (2004) argues road building has at times been characteristic of the state’s 
‘territorialising project’, that is, making claims to political/social space, and exerting control over 
people and resources at a distance, which often involve strategies of persuasion, force and seduction, 
and transplanting local offices and administrative districts. She notes roads may have different 
connotations to rural communities; in some instances, they may be seen as a path into the wider 
economy, polity and society; in others, they might be considered a threat to autonomy, and 
communities might evade ‘incorporation’. While the Peruvian state has oscillated between prioritising 
and neglecting road building, the most successful cases have generally occurred where there was 
‘consensus reached between state and population that roads-building was the way forward to 
modernity and progress’ (ibid).  
 
3.7 State-run cocoa marketing in Ghana 
 
For 25 years Ghana has consistently achieved annual growth rates of above 5%, making it one of the 
fastest growing agricultural economies in the world (Wiggins and Leturque, 2011). The country’s 
agriculture sector, and in particular its cocoa marketing system, has been particularly successful in 
connecting smallholder farmers with domestic and export markets (ibid). Through this system, the 
government acts in a stewardship role through the state-run marketing board, Cocobod, which 
oversees the production of the crop and maintains a monopoly over exports. Farmers sell cocoa 
beans to Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), and the cocoa is moved to ports and exported by the 
government-owned Cocoa Marketing Company. Studies have shown Cocobod has performed 
impressively over the past decade: produce is of premium quality, farmers receive a relatively large 
share of exports, and the system is surprisingly corruption free (Williams, 2009; Hubbard, 2003). This 
success makes Cocobod somewhat exceptional when viewed in the context of its own history of 
corruption in the period prior to the 1980s (Williams, 2009). Moreover, it goes against a wider pattern 
of poor performance in comparable systems across developing countries, many of which have been 
difficult to reform due to vested interests and rent extraction (Hubbard, 2003: Williams, 2009).  
Several analysts have noted that strong leadership has been an important factor in ensuring that the 
Ghana cocoa marketing system has been effectively insulated from political interference (Williams, 
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2009; Shepherd and Onumah, 1997). As Williams (2009) argues, the charismatic and motivated 
political leadership of J.J. Rawlings was instrumental in pushing through a series of ‘well-directed’ 
reforms to the system during the 1980s and 1990s. Wiggins and Leturque (2011) note that agricultural 
growth took off after Rawlings came to power in 1981, and has since been sustained in part by the 
regime’s consistent commitment to agricultural development during a period of relative political and 
economic stability. Williams (2009) argues that the authoritarian nature of the regime made it well 
positioned to be able to push through genuine economic reforms.  
Others have observed that, although reforms to the cocoa marketing system were financed by donors 
under structural adjustment, the government has been able to retain a sense of local ownership over 
the system, and to resist donor pressure for full liberalisation (Hubbard, 2003; Wiggins and Leturque, 
2011). As Hubbard (2003) concludes, the nature of the reforms adopted by government balanced 
efficiency with national ownership, thereby satisfying the donors as well as Ghanaian nationalists. 
Some argue that the effects of this strong leadership, and in particular the government’s commitment 
to quality, have trickled down to the organisational level. Williams (2009) argues that the system’s 
relative insulation from corruption is partly explainable by the Cocoa Marketing Company’s almost 
Weberian standards of organisational performance; with high levels of professionalism, merit-based 
appointments, and reliable salaries.  
There is some indication that the incentives behind the government’s long-term commitment to cocoa 
marketing are at least partly derived from a political impetus to court the support of cocoa farmers, 
and that this political imperative has transcended authoritarian and democratic regimes. Wiggins and 
Leturque (2011) describe how Rawlings built this constituency of support among cocoa farmers 
through a combination of personal charisma, authoritarianism and the fragmented nature of the 
opposition. Remnants of the influence of cocoa farmers as a source of state legitimacy are still 
perceptible, and reforms to increase farmers’ share of exports gained added momentum after 
democratisation in 1992, in response to widespread dissatisfaction at the low price of cocoa. Since 
democratisation, the government of Ghana has faced political pressure to respond to the demands of 
cocoa producers, partly because of the scale of the cocoa industry and the noticeable weight of cocoa 
interests in democratic politics, and partly because producer prices are a frequent topic of discussion 
in the media (Williams, 2009).  
  
3.8 Agricultural input subsidies in Malawi  
 
Malawi has recently come to be regarded as a relatively successful case of economic progress, 
poverty reduction and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In acknowledging this, 
Vandemoortele and Bird (2011) note that, although questions remain regarding the sustainability of 
recent growth in the country, overall progress is undeniable. Between 2004-2009, the country 
achieved an above-average annual GDP growth of 7%, much of which was driven by the agricultural 
sector, estimated to contribute around 39% to the economy (ibid:11).  
 
The introduction in 2005 of the Fertiliser Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) - a government-funded 
programme that increases poor smallholder farmers’ access to agricultural inputs  - has been seen as 
key driving factor behind Malawi’s recent economic progress (Chinsinga, 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 
2011; Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011). Through this programme, the government provides vouchers 
(or coupons) for maize fertilizer to farmers who are considered to be ‘productive but otherwise 
resource constrained’ (Chinsinga, 2008). Targeting and distribution is devolved to district and local 
levels, undertaken in consultation with traditional authorities, local government, and Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) (Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011). Notwithstanding ongoing 
concerns and emerging evidence that the programme has been prone to local elite capture (Eggen, 
2011), several studies have recorded positive impacts. A recent evaluation concluded that it had 
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‘substantially increased national maize production and productivity, contributing to increased food 
availability, higher real wages, wider economic growth and poverty reduction’ (Dorward and Chirwa, 
2011:232). Similarly, Chibwana, Fisher and Shively (2011) argue that dramatic increases in maize 
outputs have had wider positive effects on national and household food security.  
 
In examining the political incentives behind the government’s adoption of the FISP, much of the 
literature has emphasised that, for a number of reasons, food security is now a highly salient political 
issue in Malawi. Furthermore, agricultural inputs have over time accrued a large basis of popular 
support.  Several authors attribute this at least partly to the sheer dominance of agriculture in Malawi’s 
economy, and to the fact that an estimated 85% of the workforce is employed by it (Chirwa et al. 
2006). Others note the country’s history of chronic food insecurity (Chinsinga, 2007; Vandemoortele 
and Bird, 2011). Devereux (2009) argues fertiliser subsidies were politicised under the patronage-
based rule of President Muluzi (1994-2004), whose political power base was concentrated in the 
densly populated and food insecure south of the country. Either way, Chinsinga (2007:10,15) 
concludes that food security has become intimately bound up with the very legitimacy and survival of 
regimes in Malawi. Underlying this, she argues, is an implicit social contract that government will 
provide citizens with agricultural inputs as a social safety net in times of need.  
 
While there is some debate about whether the origins of the underlying political salience of 
agricultural input subsidies in Malawi derive from popular pressure or patronage politics, or both, there 
is consensus that elections played a catalytic role in the introduction of the FISP in 2005. As 
Chinsinga (2008) explains, these elections were preceded by two periods of severe hunger in the 
early 2000s that prompted both political parties to pledge to introduce universal subsidies if elected in 
2005. Following the elections, opposition parties in parliament were able to put pressure on the ruling 
party to stick to its pledge to adopt a universal subsidy, in spite of the President’s reservations about 
financing. Birner and Resnick (2010) note that the characteristics of fertiliser distribution – specifically, 
that it is visible, short-term, and targeted – make it particularly appealing to politicians, since it allows 
for greater political returns relative to other, longer-term agricultural investments (e.g. training, new 
crop research). In what appears to be a confirmation of this, Dorward and Chirwa (2011) have noted 
that the FISP was a high profile aspect of the President’s successful re-election in 2009.   
4. Synthesis of findings on forms of politics underpinning success 
 
It is important not to over-simplify the cases presented above, and it is not the aim here to compare 
them, but rather to indicate how aspects of politics may have combined in each individual context to 
underpin the progress made. As intimated earlier, the robustness of the evidence linking aspects of 
politics to outcomes should not be overstated. While all the cases above are validated by rigorous 
impact evaluation that attribute outcomes to interventions, the relationship between these outcomes 
and the prevailing forms of politics at national, sector and local level is more often implied than 
proven. Furthermore, because the review was limited to desk-based analysis of the available 
literature, the cases represent only a sample of possible political configurations that may underpin 
success, and are almost certainly incomplete accounts of the political factors that were important in 
each case. The cases were not drawn from ready-made accounts but compiled from disconnected 
sources. They are therefore indicative rather than comprehensive accounts of the politics of what 
works. 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the cases do indicate that it is possible to trace the connections 
between good performance and outcomes at the point of delivery, and forms of politics at local, sector 
and national levels. They suggest where future research seeking to examine the politics of what 
works more systematically might usefully focus. In this section, we synthesise the main findings about 
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the forms of politics considered to have underpinned the cases, reflecting back on the findings from 
the wider literature on the political determinants of service delivery where there are notable recurring 
themes.  
 
A number of themes about the forms of politics that underpin success recur across the case studies 
and the wider literature on the politics of service delivery, and these are synthesised in Table 2. In the 
absence of an existing conceptual framework for examining the politics of service provision, the table 
organises the key political variables influencing service provision into ‘levels of politics’ that are 
inevitably overlapping but nevertheless allow us to systematise the findings.  
 
As the table indicates, certain political variables emerged strongly in the case studies of the politics of 
what works. In particular, the relationship between pro-poor provision and crisis, transition, political 
settlements and calculations of political returns, top-down control and embedded accountability, and 
sector characteristics and modes of provision as ‘spheres of politics’, all feature prominently. These 
themes are synthesised below, and Table 3 presents more detailed findings.  
 
Table 2. Political determinants of service delivery 
 
*factors that emerge strongly in the case studies of the politics of what works 
4.1 Crisis and transition, political settlements, and calculations of political returns 
 
Overall, the case studies support the consensus that major sectoral reforms are often instigated and 
designed in the wake of periods of major economic crisis or political upheaval. This is 
demonstrated clearly in the case study on Indonesia, where the community driven development mode 
Levels of politics Variables 
Institutional conditions History of state formation, regime type, political 
settlement*, authority structures (central and local), 
relationship between delivery and state legitimacy*, global 
forces, political party ideology*, social contract*, power of 
popular ideas 
 
Political conjuncture  Moments of crisis and transition*, electoral cycles*, 
dynamics of political competition at national and level, 
political entrepreneurship 
 
Sector-level influences  
 
Service characteristics*, elite incentives for delivery 
(national and local)*, perceptions about level of political 
returns to provision*, strategies of external funders 
 
Sector-level settlements Alliances and coalitions, balance of power between 
actors, level of political commitment (leadership and 
control) from above*, relations between formal and 
informal sources of authority, relations between different 
levels of government, level of capture and clientelism, 
citizen expectations and social contract (and extent to 
which these are articulated)*  
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of provision gained momentum after the economic crisis and the fall of Suharto, which weakened the 
appeal of a centralised state. In the aftermath of crisis, determined leaders may seize the opportunity 
to frame services as nation-building projects, as indicated in the case of Rwanda, where 
improvements in health were seen as an important pillar of reconstruction following the genocide. 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, commitment to education was envisaged and actively promoted as a means of 
generating good citizenship as part of a wider programme of nation-building.  
 
The Peru case study also supports the view that basic services can be understood as tools for state- 
and nation-building; echoing Van de Walle and Scotts (2009) analysis that the state may use 
service provision to establish its control and authority over territory (‘penetration’), to create a common 
culture (‘standardisation’) and to resolve disputes, create political loyalty and bind critical populations 
to the state (‘accommodation’). Services in this instance are the point where the state becomes 
‘visible’ to citizens and, reflecting Migdal (2001), one among other means through which the state 
establishes its own ‘rules of the game’ as dominant over other social norms. As a real and symbolic 
aspect of people’s daily survival strategies, services can act as an effective means for the state to 
achieve social control and compliance (ibid).  
 
While not often explicitly framed as such, there are hints in the case studies of how the nature of the 
political settlement influences the policy choices states make with regard to service provision. In 
Bangladesh, for example, a stable political settlement has been seen as a key factor in consolidating 
the state’s credible and consistent commitment to health delivery in spite of periods of regime change. 
In a similar vein, Rwanda’s long-term vision and remarkable achievements in health have been at 
least partly attributed to its particular form of ‘developmental patrimonialism’. The cases also support 
the view that while elections may catalyse state responsiveness, the influence of formal political 
systems cannot be understood independently of the role of other institutions. The extent to which 
social contracts are articulated by an active civil society and through debate in the media may be 
key in this regard. In Malawi, for instance, while the political imperative to provide subsidies and the 
choices the state made were almost certainly catalysed by elections, but the formative social contract 
that pitches food security as a key source of state legitimacy may have been a more important driver 
of the states responsiveness to its citizens. Likewise in Ethiopia, the ruling party’s ideology and its 
particular identity as a movement of the poor has been seen as a more important underlying driver of 
commitment to pro-poor spending in education than elections per se.  
 
The cases demonstrate that political actors sometimes make policy choices that benefit poor people 
on the basis of calculations of high political returns. The (perception of) returns may be greatest 
not only where provision is a potential or existing source of state legitimacy, but also where the 
service is particularly politically salient, and/or is targeted towards the main constituency of support of 
the ruling party. Echoing the wider literature, the cases illustrate that the imperative for broad-based 
provision may derive from political actors pursuing ‘political entrepreneurship’, that is, courting a 
mass constituency of the poor in the service of their political careers. Levels of ‘political will’ for 
primary education in Ghana, for example, have been shown to fluctuate over time according to the 
extent to which the ruling party has been dependent on the support of the poor, and the extent to 
which the interests of the poor were articulated by a political entrepreneur. Similarly, agricultural 
policies gained particular political salience in Ghana and Malawi under regimes that courted the 
support of farmers, and continued to be a central source of state legitimacy where they subsequently 
attracted a large basis of citizen support. Overall, the cases advance the hypothesis that pro-poor 
provision is more likely where the state derives or seeks to enhance its legitimacy through the 
provision of a particular service. 
4.2 Top-down control and embedded accountability 
 
The politics of what works in service delivery: An evidence-based review  
 
27 
@manchester.ac.uk 
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) 
School of Environment and Development, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, 
There is some evidence in the case studies in support of recent thinking that organisations can be 
effective - even in clientelistic settings - where they are insulated from political interference by 
strong, top-down authority and leadership carried through to the level of implementation. This is 
explicitly demonstrated in the corruption-free bureaucracy of Cocobod, and also in the bureaucratic 
arena in Rwanda, which is characterised by strong, top-down performance incentives. The 
Rwanda case indicates that top-down incentives and bureaucratic control may be reinforced where 
the state is perceived as legitimate and has moral authority, and where top-down control draws on 
culturally embedded norms of accountability. But while the role of top-down accountability comes out 
strongly in Rwanda and Ghana, in other cases there is evidence that a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up accountability can drive progress, as in Indonesia, where they worked in tandem but to 
different effect. The case studies therefore support the move in wider literature towards examining top 
down and bottom up accountability as complementary as opposed to being an ‘either or’ proposition.  
 
The cases also illustrate findings made elsewhere that pro-poor service provision might occur where 
forms of social accountability draw on moral reciprocity, are locally-grounded, and build on a 
culture of participation. For example, the accountability of local leaders in the health sector in 
Bangladesh depended on the extent to which those leaders were ‘embedded’ in local networks of 
relationships between local authorities, citizen groups and service providers. In Peru, the fact that 
agencies contracted to build and maintain roads were formed from local communities increased local 
ownership and therefore generated incentives for good performance.  
4.3 Sector characteristics and modes of provision as ‘spheres of politics’ 
 
The cases demonstrate that the characteristics of a particular service affect its political salience 
and in turn the calculations of political returns made by political actors. Specifically, the findings 
reinforce the point made elsewhere that extent to which a service is targetable, ‘visible’, measurable 
and easily credited may determine the likelihood of state responsiveness. For example, direct 
transfers for roads in Indonesia were appealing because roads are highly visible and direct transfers 
are easily creditable. In Bangladesh, progress in health reform is at least partly attributable to the 
nature of the reforms – namely improving access rather than quality - which ultimately pursued the 
path of least resistance. This supports the theme raised earlier that anticipation of resistance from 
interest groups may explain why some reforms are pursued and others are not, and different types of 
reform attract different types of politics. 
 
The cases also indicate that particular mode of provision may influence the extent to which citizens 
can engage in collective action. In both of the roads cases - Peru and Indonesia - the participatory 
approach was considered to have enabled services to be more adapted to local preferences, and 
particularly to women’s preferences. In Peru, participatory institutions had effects (both positive and 
negative) on notions of citizenship and interactions between the state, society and elites at a local 
level. Similarly, decentralisation in Ethiopia - a mode of provision essential for accommodating 
diversity in the context of high ethnic fragmentation - has in turn generated positive social capital and 
enabled collective action. However, it is not possible to conclude on the relative success of modes 
from the evidence available. It seems likely that the performance of modes is very context specific. 
Moreover, the cases make it clear that modes are not simple categories (e.g. direct state versus 
contracted out provision); most real life cases are composites of more than one mode and include 
both formal and informal elements.  
At the micro-level of the politics of implementation, the cases highlight that the terms of collaboration 
between the actors engaged in delivery may enable or constrain service outcomes. The Ghana 
School for Life study indicates that whether or not public services are delivered effectively depends on 
the extent to which there is mutual agreement and positive, reciprocal relationships between state and 
non-state actors. This supports the findings from the relatively small body of research suggesting 
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mutually supportive state-NGO relationships that have evolved from a basis of trust are an important 
but relatively neglected sphere of politics.  
 
Table 3. Detailed findings from case studies  
Country/Sector Mode of 
provision 
Indicators of progress Political factors underlying progress  
Rwanda, 
Maternal and 
Child Health 
Contracting-
in/Performance-
based financing  
Sharp decline in 
maternal mortality 
(30%), under five 
mortality (32%) and 
infant mortality (28%) 
between 2000-2005  
 Post-genocide political settlement 
characterised by ‘developmental 
patrimonialism’ 
 Strong leadership behind nation-building 
project 
 Government ownership 
 Strong top-down performance incentives 
and bureaucratic control, supported by 
the moral authority of the state 
 Mode of provision fits with traditional, 
culturally-embedded norms of 
accountability 
Bangladesh, 
Maternal and 
Child Health 
Decentralised 
state provision 
Sharp decline (44%) in 
maternal mortality 
since independence 
 Consistent commitment in spite of 
changes in regime 
 Stable political settlement 
 Perception of high political returns from 
health delivery, and political party 
competition on this basis 
 Nature of reforms doesn’t challenge 
vested interests 
 More successful in upazilas where local 
leaders are embedded in networks of 
accountability relationships 
Ghana, Basic 
Education 
Non-state 
provision/co-
production 
Net enrolment in 
primary school 
increased 60%-77% 
1999-2008 
 
School for Life reached 
85,000 children in the 
North 
 Periods of ‘political will’ depended on 
constituencies of the poor being 
mobilised by political entrepreneurs  
 Complementary education highly adapted 
to local preferences 
 Supportive government-NGO relationship 
and non-competitive funding 
arrangements 
Ethiopia, Basic 
Education 
Decentralised 
state provision 
Number of out of 
school children more 
than halved between 
1999-2008 , from 6.5 
million to 2.7 million  
 Strong ideological commitment to pro-
poor development on the part of the 
ruling party 
 Pro-poor ideology is a source of state 
legitimacy 
 Decentralised mode of provision 
accommodates ethnic diversity 
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Indonesia, Rural 
Roads 
Decentralised 
state provision 
Built or rehabilitated 
over 62,000 km of 
roads between 1998-
2009, with wider 
positive impacts on 
rural poverty 
 Economic and political crisis increased 
appeal of community-driven approaches 
 Mode of delivery built on pre-existing 
norms of participation  
 Perception of political returns from 
‘visible’ direct transfers 
 Mode of delivery highly adapted to local 
preferences and encourages women’s 
participation 
 Combination of top-down and bottom-up 
accountability 
Peru, Rural 
Roads 
Contracting out Rehabilitated 15,000kn 
of roads between 
1995-2005, with wider 
positive impacts on 
local economic 
productivity and rural 
poverty 
 Mode of delivery adapted to local 
preferences and encourages women’s 
participation 
 Local contractors are formed from, and 
embedded in, local communities 
 Participatory mode builds trust between 
state and society, and enhances political 
inclusion and citizenship  
Ghana, 
Agricultural 
Marketing 
State regulation 
and 
stewardship 
Sustained annual 
growth of above 5% for 
25 years, supported by 
agricultural growth and 
cocoa exports 
 Strong leadership insulating state 
marketing board from political 
interference 
 Government ownership 
 Strong top-down performance incentives 
and bureaucratic control 
 Farmers are a key constituency and a 
source of legitimacy for the ruling regime 
 Popular pressure and interest groups 
supporting farmers and good political 
returns 
Malawi, 
Agricultural 
Marketing 
 
 
 
 
 
Input subsidies 
through 
vouchers  
Annual growth of 7% 
between 2004-2009, 
supported by 
agricultural growth 
 Issue has political salience due to context 
of food insecurity 
 Delivery of service is a source of state 
legitimacy 
 Mass constituency of popular support and 
high visibility of mode = good political 
returns 
 Catalytic role of electoral competition 
 Government ownership 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Understanding the politics of what works in service delivery 
 
The case studies and wider literature indicate both a growing and a more integrated treatment of the 
politics of service provision. Many of the findings about the forms of politics underpinning the case 
studies of what works are anchored in the literature examined in section 2. Some specific hypotheses 
about why states make particular choices, about what generate incentives for elite commitment, and 
about how this is translated into improved service outcomes could be tested through further empirical 
research.  
 
In particular, the studies of what works support the prominence given to the role of the nature of the 
political regime, the political conjuncture, and the origins of elite incentives as key determinants of 
inclusive social provisioning. They illustrate the state may have strong incentives for inclusive 
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provision where a particular service or good has historically been a key source of state legitimacy and 
an expression of the social contract. Calculations of political returns on the part of political actors, 
linked in some cases to the pursuit of political entrepreneurship, have also been critical to some cases 
where remarkable improvements in service provision have been achieved. The characteristics of a 
particular service – or the extent to which it is targetable, ‘visible’, measurable and easily credited - 
affect its political salience and in turn the likelihood of state responsiveness. 
 
Resources alone do not determine outcomes on the ground: politics intervene (in either an enabling 
or constraining role) between policy intention and implementation. Some of the cases indicate that 
strong, top-down accountability reinforced by a legitimate state with some degree of moral authority 
can work, particularly if top-down control can ‘insulate’ delivery systems from the normal functioning of 
prevailing political institutions. At the local level, there are particular questions raised by the cases 
about the positive effects of social accountability systems that are genuinely locally-grounded and 
draw on moral and cultural norms. At the point of implementation, reciprocal terms of collaboration 
between state and non-state actors have been instrumental in some cases.  
 
While research has made important advances in identifying political factors that determine the design 
and implementation of services, significant gaps in our understanding remain. The identification of the 
politics of what ‘works’ was constrained by a paucity of studies of service delivery that combine both 
an objective assessment of outcomes (i.e. an impact evaluation) with systematic analysis of the 
political determinants of outcomes. Our review revealed not only the rarity of cases subjected both to 
political analysis and technical impact evaluation but also, more critically, the problem that there is a 
wide gulf between them. Sector-level political economy analysis has more often been problem-driven 
than directed at understanding ‘successful’ cases, and rigorous impact evaluations are by nature 
technical accounts that almost never analyse politics.
27
 Comparative case studies of sub-national 
states, regions and districts where resource levels are similar, but where outcomes are different, are 
rare in the literature. Such studies could provide valuable insight into what accounts for relatively well 
and poorly performing states and offer a rigorous methodology for understanding the politics of what 
works. 
 
5.1 The basis of an approach to understanding what works 
 
There is a need for research that examines the influence of politics ‘in the round’: that is, based on a 
framework that brings together aspects of politics and explores them systematically through case 
studies of provision.  
 
Future research needs to give special importance to the point of implementation, where formal 
policies most often fail and where ‘real’ policies emerge from the interplay of interests and incentives. 
and adopt an essentially ‘bottom-up’ approach to the field research, working upwards in order to 
identify the key political factors that underpin performance. This would put the focus on those 
institutions, incentives and actors that are effective at the point of delivery - rather than on those that 
in the formal scheme of things are supposed to set the institutional and policy framework governing 
implementation. This approach would be particularly appropriate and timely given the growing 
recognition that, in practice, delivery is often facilitated through informal, ad hoc arrangements that 
rely on relationships of reciprocity and alliances across blurred public-private boundaries. The focus 
on real implementation rather than stated policy needs also to understand the pressures from ‘above’ 
that condition behaviour in practice: the institutions and actors that set the general political framework, 
                                                             
27
 This problem was particularly acute in the productive sectors, and studies of other sectors could offer different findings. The chosen 
sectors follow the terms of reference for this paper. More political analysis may have been available if our focus had been on other 
sectors. For example, urban water has been one of the most politicized of all areas of service reform.  As one reviewer commented, cases 
from the sanitation sector could have provided another set of themes and propositions. 
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and the organizational arrangements that establish who's who and the rules of the game at the 
sectoral and local level. 
 
Such research could focus on the point of contact between citizen/user and the state, seeking to 
clarify and operationalize the concept of the social contract, which is frequently described as central to 
the delivery of basic services, but often left without explanation or practical meaning. The idea of the 
social contract might be more comprehensible, and useful to researchers and policymakers, if it were 
anchored at the sector or service level. In practical terms, the idea of ‘sector-level settlements’ or 
‘sector social contracts’ could enable better understanding of the influence of aspects of politics from 
policy inception to implementation – such as the bargains made between political and civil society 
actors, the political salience of the service, the level of citizen pressure for its provision and how this is 
voiced, and the perceived political returns in delivering it.  
Two aspects of services - the characteristics of sectors and their mode of delivery - have more often 
been treated as managerial rather than political spheres. The characteristics of sectors have often 
been regarded as technical considerations affecting problems of market failure and the appropriate 
role of the state. Although some attempts have been made to analyse how the characteristics of 
sectors influence the relative power of principals and agents, providers and consumers of services, 
these have not been applied widely or systematically. Modes of provision (state, market, and forms of 
partnership and co-production) have also often been treated mainly as matters involving technical 
considerations of efficiency. However, they are also a product of politics and a theatre of politics. They 
are the formal and informal organizational structures and rules for the direction of service provision. 
Modes are where politics is ‘realized’ in decision making structures and where politics and the state 
are experienced  by citizens: (i) who and what interests are part of the decision process, (ii) what are 
the rules of inclusion and exclusion to benefits? Future research should therefore analyse sector 
characteristics and modes of delivery as spheres of politics. 
5.2 Seeing the relationship between services and politics as two-way 
 
The findings indicate that it isn’t only that politics determines service delivery, but that in turn, service 
delivery determines forms of politics. Future research needs to be multi-directional, tracing both the 
influence of politics on services and, in turn, the influence of services on politics. While this has been 
a major focus of policy and research on fragile states, in the case of effective states there has been 
little analysis of whether and how local and sectoral practices feed back into higher level political 
practices. This could trace the implications of successful delivery on the formation of the social 
contract, on the capacity and legitimacy of the state, and on processes of citizenship formation. 
Closer attention to these feedback effects may enhance our understanding of what motivates states 
to pursue inclusive forms of provision in the first instance, and in particular the level of political returns 
they perceive in doing so.  
 
In this vein, services should be analysed not only as a value (output performance) in themselves but 
also as contributing to processes of state-building. Research could test the hypothesis that the 
provision of services is supported by, and in turn supports, the legitimacy and durability of political 
settlements and a more resilient and inclusive social contract (Whaites, 2008; OECD, 2008). These 
principles have so far mainly been applied to fragile and conflict affected settings, but they apply 
equally in more effective states. State-building is not only a process that occurs in the aftermath of 
conflict and collapse but is also a continuous process in all states as they accommodate to changing 
environments and interactions with other states.  
5.3 Conceptual framework and research questions 
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Based on the findings of this review - both the case studies and the wider literature on the political 
determinants of service delivery - Figure 1 suggests a basic framework for integrating the various 
aspects of politics operating at different levels into a coherent whole. This framework is necessarily 
broad, and future research will need to strategically narrow the focus to enable feasible comparative 
studies. It suggests a hypothetical causal chain of influences that go from the macro-institutional 
factors through sector level influences and strategies to the delivery of services and political effects. 
At each level, a leading research question is proposed. 
 
 Institutional conditions: Institutional and contextual factors condition the environment in 
which services are prioritized, planned, organized and delivered. These can be grouped first 
as the organization of political power (state regime type and authority structures) arising from 
the political settlement. Second, there are conjunctural factors that, at particular times, alter 
the incentives of actors - for example the cycles of political competition determine the 
incentives of actors to be responsive to demand. Third, there are factors that directly impinge 
on sector policy choices: the characteristics of particular services, sources of funding and the 
accountabilities they imply, and how these interact with elite incentives to provide them. 
o What is the influence of conditioning factors in framing the incentives of policy actors 
at sector level and, directly or indirectly, on service performance?  
 
 Political conjuncture: Within this institutional environment, sector-specific actors may enter 
into understandings about the governance of particular service sectors, the leading 
stakeholders and long term policy goals. We describe these as ‘secondary’ or ‘sector’ level 
settlements. They may be formal agreements or informal understandings and be made at 
national or local level. 
o What is the influence of interactions between actors in forming sector level 
settlements about the governance of service sectors? 
 
 Sector-level influences and settlements: In turn, institutional conditions and political 
conjuncture set the framework of dominant actors and permissible understandings which can 
influence service strategies (prioritization, sequencing and funding) and decisions about 
modes of provision and the roles of actors. Strategies may be formal statements or emerge 
from working practice.  
o What is the influence of dominant actors and understandings in forming strategies 
and deciding modes of service provision? 
 
 Service strategies and service outcomes: Service strategies and modes of provision 
produce effects in the form of (i) service outputs/outcomes, and (ii) political effects in setting 
relations of accountability and control between citizens/users, service delivery agencies and 
government.  
o What are the political effects of modes of provision and service outputs on public 
perceptions of performance, opportunities/citizen capacity for collective action, 
inclusion/exclusion of groups, elite incentives, and the reach of government? 
 
 Political outcomes: There are potential feedback loops where the political effects of service 
delivery may positively or negatively influence broader changes in relations between 
users/citizens, state and elites at the level of the political settlement and the social contract.  
o What, in turn, are the effects of service provision on building the capacity and 
resilience of the state, legitimising public authority and forming stable political 
settlements? 
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An implicit underlying issue throughout the framework is how and by whom control is exercised over 
what services are delivered and to whom. This could be a core running theme of future research on 
the politics of what works in service delivery. ‘Control’ would include the exercise of political authority, 
means of coordination between state and non-state agencies, and arrangements to hold to account 
political leaders, state and non-state agencies for commitments to service delivery. Different forms of 
authority, coordination and accountability would be expected to operate at different points in the 
framework, and to operate differently depending on the service and the context. 
 
Figure 1. The two-way relationship between politics and service delivery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sector-level influences  
Service characteristics, elite incentives for delivery (national and local), perceptions 
about level of political returns to provision, strategies of external funders 
 
Feedback 
effects 
citizenship 
formation, 
state capacity 
and legitimacy, 
formation of 
social contract 
Political conjuncture 
Moments of crisis and transition, electoral cycles, dynamics of political competition 
at national and level 
Institutional conditions 
History of state formation, regime type, political settlement, authority structures 
(central and local), state legitimacy, global forces, political party ideology, social 
contract, power of popular ideas 
Political outcomes 
Centre-periphery relations, opportunities for collective action, degree to which 
service addresses or reinforces inequality and exclusion, responsiveness of 
services to local priorities and expectations about mode of provision 
Service outcomes  
Scale, inclusion, coverage, performance against indicators 
Service strategies  
Institutional/organisational capacity and levels of funding, mode of provision, terms 
of collaboration, knowledge and evidence 
Sector-level settlements  
Alliances and coalitions, balance of power between actors, level of political 
commitment (leadership and control) from above, relations between formal and 
informal sources of authority, relations between levels of government, level of 
capture and clientelism, citizen expectations and social contract (and extent to 
which these are articulated)  
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Annex 1. Glossary of terms  
 
This annex provides basic definitions of the service-delivery related concepts used in this paper. It 
does not aim to represent the diversity of perspectives or ongoing debates surrounding the meaning 
of these terms, but to offer a starting point for understanding. 
 
Concept 
 
Basic definition and further resources 
 
Accountability The ‘long route’ of accountability is the means through which clients/citizens 
influence policymakers, and of policymakers to influence service providers. The 
‘short route’ is the means through which consumers/citizens exercise power 
directly over providers (World Bank, 2003). Social accountability is any form of 
accountability that relies on civic engagement. 
See:  
World Bank, 2003, 'Making Services Work for Poor People, World Development 
Report 2004', World Bank, Washington D.C 
Joshi, A., 2008, 'Producing Social Accountability? The Impact of Service Delivery 
Reforms', IDS Bulletin, Volume 38, Number 6, pp. 10-17(8) 
Co-production Co-production is the joint and direct involvement of both public agents and private 
citizens in the provision of services (Ostrom, 1996). Institutionalised co-
production is the provision of public services through a regular, long-term 
relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both 
make substantial resource contributions (Joshi and Moore, 2004). 
See: 
 Ostrom, E., 1996, ‘Crossing the Great Divide; Co-production, Synergy, and 
Development’, World Development, Vol.24, No.6, pp.1073–88. 
 Joshi, A. and Moore, M., 2004, ‘Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox 
Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments’, Journal of 
Development Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 31-49 
Citizenship formation Gaining citizenship is not only a legal process of being defined as a bearer of 
rights, but involves the development of citizens as individuals with agency, 
capable of claiming their rights and acting for themselves (Benequista and 
Gaventa, 2011). Inequalities in access to resources (e.g. basic services) feed on 
and reproduce asymmetries in social relationships (Kabeer, 2002). 
See: 
 Benequista, N. and Gaventa, J, 2011, Blurring the Boundaries: Citizen Action 
across States and Societies—A Summary of Findings from a Decade of 
Collaborative Research on Citizen Engagement, Brighton: Development 
Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability  
 Kabeer, N., 2002, 'Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Acknowledged 
Community: Identity, Affiliation and Exclusion', IDS Working Paper no 171 
Incentives Incentives are ‘the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to 
be related to their actions and those of others’ (Ostrom 2002, cited in Harris, 
Jones and Kooy, 2011:26). In service provision, a leading question is how the 
incentives of decision-makers (for provision) can be aligned with the interests of 
society. Questions about incentives are closely linked to questions about 
motivation and forms of accountability (Collier, 2007). Incentives may be shaped 
by resources, information, decision-making, delivery mechanism, and 
accountability (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004).  
See: 
 Collier, P., 2007. Accountability in the Provision of Social Services: A 
Framework for African Research, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African 
Economies 
 Pritchett, L., and Woolcock, M., 2004, Solutions When the Solution is the 
Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development, World Development, 
Volume 32, Issue 2, February 2004, Pages 191-212 
Information asymmetry Information asymmetry is the imbalance of information between parties engaged 
in a transaction. Without access to information, it it is difficult for citizens to 
attribute blame or credit to politicians or service providers for the quality of 
services (Keefer and Khemani, 2003). Community monitoring (collecting 
information about the activities of politicians and service performance) is often 
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conceived as a means of overcoming information asymmetry and increasing the 
principal’s (citizens) bargaining power and control (Gauthier and Reinikka, 2007). 
See: 
 Keefer, P., and Khemani, S., 2003, Democracy, Public Expenditures and the 
Poor, Development Research Group, Washington D.C: World Bank 
 Gauthier, B., and Reinikka, R., 2007, Methodological Approaches to the 
Study of Institutions and Service Delivery: A Review of PETS, QSDS and 
CRCS’,  Washington: World Bank 
Institutions Institutions are ‘humanly-devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction’, or simply “the rules of the game” (North, 1991). Formal 
and informal political institutions play an important role in shaping interests and in 
determining incentives for service provision. Informal institutions and 
personalised relationships are pervasive influences on policymaking (Unsworth et 
al. 2010).  
See: 
 Unsworth, S. (ed.), 2010, 'An Upside Down View of Governance', Centre for 
the Future State, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton : Institute of 
Development Studies  
Principal-agent  The ‘principal-agent’ model draws attention to the difficulties that citizens (as 
‘principals’) face in ensuring that the actions of politicians (the ‘agents’) are 
aligned with their purpose, and the problem that governments (as ‘principals’) 
face in constraining the behaviour of their bureaucracies (as ‘agents’) (Batley, 
2004). Accountability is a principal-agent relationship (Gauthier and Reinikka, 
2007).  
See:  
 Batley, R., 2004, The politics of service delivery reform, Development and 
Change 35(1): 31-56 
 Gauthier, B., and Reinikka, R., 2007, Methodological Approaches to the 
Study of Institutions and Service Delivery: A Review of PETS, QSDS and 
CRCS’,  Washington: World Bank 
Social contract A social contract is an implicit understanding between citizens and governments 
that the former will receive the benefits of political order in return for ceding some 
freedoms to the latter. Services are sometimes seen to comprise a core element 
of the social contract between states and citizens. Public access to good services 
indicates that a society is well-governed and enables the political leadership to 
draw continued support for its programme (OECD, 2008). 
See: 
 OECD, 2008, ‘Service Delivery in Fragile Situations’, Paris: OECD 
State-society relations State-society relations are ‘interactions between state institutions and societal 
groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be 
influenced by people’ (DFID, 2010:15).  
See:  
 DFID, 2010, Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper, 
Department for International Development, London 
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